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A problem facing the United States and many other countries is how to finance retirement 
consumption as the number of their workers per retiree falls.  The problem with a savings for 
retirement systems is that there is a shortage of good savings opportunities given the nature of 
most current tax systems and governments’ limited ability to honor the debt it issues.  We find 
that eliminating capital income taxes will greatly increase saving opportunities and make a 
savings-for-retirement system feasible with only modest amount of government debt.  The 
switch from a system close to the current U.S. retirement system, which relies heavily on taxing 
workers’ incomes and making lump-sum transfers to retirees, to one without income taxes will 
increase the welfare of all birth-year cohorts alive today and particularly the welfare of the yet 
unborn cohorts.  The equilibrium paths for the current and alternative policies are computed. 
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1. Introduction 
An important policy issue is how to finance retirement consumption in light of the falling 
number of workers per retiree in many countries including the United States.  This fall is due to 
population growth rates slowing and mortality rates falling.
1   In the tradition of Ramsey we rule 
out lump-sum taxes to finance retirement consumption.  We also limit the amount of debt that a 
government can honor, because at some level of debt, potential lenders will not lend to the 
government because of default fears.  Given these constraints, most retirement consumption must 
be financed by a combination of retirees selling assets they accumulated over their working-life 
and by lump-sum transfers to retirees.   
The problem with the use of the lump-sum transfers to retirees system is that there is a 
dead-weight loss associated with taxing workers to finance these transfers. A problem with 
relying on savings to finance all retirement consumption, at least with the current U.S. tax 
system, is that the value of equity is too small. In a closed economy, private savings is equal to 
equity plus government debt as net lending between households and the businesses they own is 
zero.  Saving abroad is not a solution because net foreign savings summed over all countries is 
zero.  
We find large social gains to the elimination of capital income taxation, because private 
savings opportunities are dramatically increased. The increase occurs for two reasons. First, there 
is the well-known reason that with this tax policy the capital-output ratio is higher. Second, there 
is a not so well-known and quantitatively important reason: The no-capital-income-tax policy 
results in a large increase in the value of private business equity.
2 The increase in the market 
value of equity permits the financing of retirement consumption through savings and there is no 
                                                 
1 See De Nardi, Imrohorglu, and Sargent (1999) for an analysis. 
2 For a closed economy, the net worth of the private sector is the value of equity plus the net government debt.  2 
 
need to tax workers’ labor income to finance lump-sum transfers to retirees.  This is with 
demographics that result in the number of workers per retiree falling from its current value of 
three to only two. 
We revise the national accounts so that they better conform to the theory used here, and 
throughout this paper we use these adjusted accounts. One major revision is that we use 
producers prices consistently, which means subtracting consumption taxes from income and 
private consumption.  A second adjustment is that we add the implicit services of consumer 
durables to consumption.  This adjustment increases gross national product (GNP).  Consumer 
durable expenditures are treated as investments.   
An important point is that the stock of (non-human) capital is larger than the commonly 
used value in macroeconomic analyses. For example, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) use a 
capital share consistent with a capital stock of 2.8 times GNP.
3  With a capital stock of 3.5 times 
GNP, Birkeland and Prescott (2007) show that a large government debt to GNP ratio is needed 
with a savings-for-retirement system and current demographic trends.  
Our estimate is that the U.S. capital stock at reproduction cost is about 5.8 GNPs and that 
changing the tax system appropriately will increase this stock to 7.1 GNPs. Thus, there is not the 
need for large government debt with a saving-for-retirement system even if the number of 
workers per retiree falls from three to two.
4 
We make five additions to fixed capital assets to obtain the larger capital stock.  First, we 
include the value of land, which is in fact mostly capital as nearly all its value is the result of past 
                                                 
3 We do not include non-rival human capital in the model’s capital stock. The reason we do not include this large 
stock of capital is that in retirement human capital cannot be sold and the proceeds used to finance retirement 
consumption. 
4 The problem is not that the aging population will lead to over-capital accumulation with a savings-for-retirement 
system.  Absent forced savings, there cannot be an equilibrium with over capital accumulation if debt contracts are 
permitted. This was established by Thompson (1967, p. 1206).  Abel, Mankiw, Summers and Zeckhauser’s  (1989) 
findings that over capital accumulation was not the case U.S. in the period they examined hold for the economies 
and policies we consider.      3 
 
investments made in improving undeveloped land.
5 Second, we include the stock of inventories. 
Third, we include the stock of consumer durables.  Fourth, we add government owned capital as 
its services are inputs to production. These additions increase the stock of tangible capital from 
3.0 GNPs to 4.1 GNPs. Finally, we include the McGrattan and Prescott (2010) estimate of 
intangible business capital, 1.7 GNPs, to obtain a current capital stock measure of 5.8 GNPs.   
We use an overlapping-generations structure; therefore, government debt is part of the 
private sector’s net worth. We compute not only the balanced growth paths, but also the 
equilibrium transition paths, with the initial state calibrated to the current U.S. economy, for two 
alternative tax systems and two alternative demographic assumptions. The first tax system is 
essentially the one currently in use with its high income tax rates and large transfers to retirees. 
The second one has no income taxes and makes no retirement-transfers to retirees. The first 
choice of demographics is one with three workers per retirees now and in the future.  The second 
choice is one which results in the number of workers per retiree falling to two. 
The balanced growth paths are determined for both demographics and welfare 
comparisons made.  The measure of welfare is remaining-lifetime consumption equivalents for 
those birth-year cohorts currently alive and lifetime consumption equivalents for those joining 
the workforce in the future.   
Recent research has focused on the role of social security with incomplete markets. 
Krueger and Kubler (2002), for example, show that a pay-as-you-go social security system may 
be Pareto improving due to improved risk sharing between generations. Conesa and Krueger 
(1999) find that idiosyncratic income uncertainty within generations implies a majority of current 
                                                 
5 See Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007) for introducing developers into a competitive equilibrium model with 
endogenous cities. Apparently, the BEA does not included land as a component of fixed assets at reproduction costs 
because they do not have good measures of these costs.  The lack of measures of the value of land at reproduction 
costs is why we use market values in our capital stock number.  
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voters lose in the transition from a fully funded system to a pay-as-you-go system. We provide a 
reform in which no cohort incurs welfare losses in the transition. Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger 
(2009) find that in an OLG model with borrowing constraints, idiosyncratic income risk, and no 
annuity markets, the optimal capital tax rate may be positive. This is based on maximization of a 
social welfare function. We compute lifetime welfare gains for every birth-year cohort, and do 
no restrict attention to steady states or a particular social welfare function. 
In Section 2 we present the model used to evaluate the alternative retirement financing 
systems. In Section 3 we develop the income and product accounts, the capital accounts, and the 
balance sheets.  To do this we use the U.S. Department of Commerce’s National Income and 
Product Accounts (NIPA) appropriately modified to be consistent with theory and the U.S. 
Department of Commerce Fixed Capital Accounts. In Section 4, we select the parameters to be 
consistent with these accounts and with demographic data. We verify that the model’s prediction 
for household net worth is close to the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds reported value. In 
Section 5, we report the balanced growth paths for an economy where the growth rate of new 
work-force entrants continues at 1 percent annually and for an economy where there is no growth 
in the number of new work-force entrants for both the current tax system and the proposed 
alternative.  We also report the equilibrium paths if there is no growth in the number of 
workforce entrants and the welfare differences for each birth-year cohort. In Section 6, we 
provide a summary of the findings and some concluding remarks. 
2. The Model Economy Used 
The model economy has an overlapping-generation structure with measure 
1
t n  arriving working-
age households at the beginning of date t.  Years since entry into the workforce is called age and 
is denoted by j . The number of age  j households at date t is 
j
t n . The maximum possible age is 5 
 
J.  The probability of an age   jJ  household at date t surviving to age  1 j    is  0  
j
t . The 
1
t n  
are parameters that define the population dynamics.  We restrict attention to  
  
11
1 (1 ) tt nn     
with 
1
0 1 n  , where   is the growth rate of households entering the workforce. 
State vector 
To simplify notation, we use the recursive competitive equilibrium language. Given that the 
economy is non-stationary, t is included as an element of the aggregate state vector. All stocks 
are beginning of period stocks. The variables that define the aggregate state vector s are as 
follows: 
(i)    0,1,2, t   is the time period. 
(ii)  {,}
jj an are the  assets 
j a  (net worth) of an age  j  household and 
j n  the measure 
of age  j  households.  
(iii)   B  is the government debt owned by the private sector. 
(iv)  12  and  TT KK  are the aggregate tangible capital stocks for the two business sectors 
(described below). 
(v)  12  and  II KK  are the aggregate intangible capital stocks for two business sectors. 
The reason that two business sectors are needed is that different legal categories of businesses 
are subject to very different tax systems and, as a consequence, the market values of their equity 
and net debt relative to their capital stock are different.  The empirical counterpart of sector 1 is 
Schedule C corporations that are subject to the corporate income tax.  Schedule S and other 
corporations that distribute all profits to owners, unincorporated businesses, and household 6 
 
businesses are in sector 2.  Government enterprises and the government production sector are in 
sector 2 as well. 
Prices and policy 
The equilibrium price sequences are interest rates { } t i and wage rates { } t w .  
  Policy specifies the following sequences: 
(i)  Tax rates  12 1 {, , ,, }
cdd
ttt tt
   

 , where c denotes consumption, d distributions from 
businesses to their owners,  labor services, and   profits. Note that sector 2 businesses 
are not subject to the corporate profit tax and must distribute all their profits to their 
owners. 
(ii)  Age-dependent lump-sum transfers to households{}
j
t   . 
(iii)  Government debt { } t B . 
(iv)  Pure public good consumption{} t G . 
Constraints on the stock of government debt relative to GNP are 
tB t t B GNP   , 
where  Bt   are policy-constraint parameters.  The motivation for this constraint is that empirically 
governments have limited ability to commit to honor their sovereign debt promises.  
  The final set of policy variables is the public goods consumptions{ } t G , which are given 
fractions of GNP:  
 . tG t t GG N P    
 7 
 
The households’ problem 
Savings are in the form of an annuity which makes payments to a cohort in their retirement years 
conditional on them being alive.  All in a cohort enter symmetrically and there are no non-
convexities.  Consequently, all retirees of a given age at a point in time agree as to their optimal 
retirement distribution. Effectively the return on savings depends upon the survival probability as 
well as the interest rate. 
 Symbol   denotes labor services of a household.  Aggregate labor supply L is  
  jj j Ln   . 
The value function of an individual of age  {1,2,..., } j J    satisfy 
1 ', , 0 (,) m a x {(,) (' ,' ) }
j
jt j ac va s u c v as    
 
  subject to  
 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
jc j
tt t t t t ai aw c        
   
  '( ) . sF s     
In the above, 1 0 J v   . Note that households aged  R j J  are retired and their  's   are zero. Note 
also, a component of the state is t.  The equilibrium law of motion of the aggregate state variable 
F is taken as given by the private agents.   
Technology 
There is a sector that is subject to the corporate income tax and that produces intermediate good 
1t Y  and a sector that produces intermediate good  2t Y .  The aggregate production function of the 
composite final good  t Y  is  
 
12
12 , tt t YY Y
    8 
 
where the exponents are positive and sum to 1. 
  The aggregate sectorial production function are Cobb-Douglas with inputs of tangible 
capital  iTt K , intangible capital  iIt K , and labor  it L : 
 
1 ( )  for  1,2
iT iI iT iI
it iTt iIt t it YK K L i
      . 
Labor-augmenting technical level at date t in both sectors is  t  , which grows at rate  , so 
1 (1 )  . tt     




(1 )    for   1,2
(1 )      for   1,2
iT t iT iTt iTt









   
where T and I  denote tangible and intangible, respectively, and  X  is investment. Depreciation 
rates are   and are indexed by sector and capital type. 
The resource balance constraint is 
   , ttT tI tt YCX X G     
where  Tt iTt i X X   and  . It iIt i X X    
Government budget constraints 
Some notation must be set up before the law of motion for government debts can be specified. 
The prices of the intermediate good relative to the final good are  1t p and  2t p . Sector 1 accounting 
profits are 
  11 1 111 1 tt t t tI t T T t pY wL X K       
and distributions to its owners are 
11 1 1 , 1 1 (1 ) . tt t T t T t DK K
        9 
 
Sector 2 distributions to its owners are 
  22 2 2 2 2 2 2 tt t t t t T T tI t Dp Y w L K X       . 
We can now specify the law of motion of government debt. It is 
11 1 1 1 2 2  .
jj c d d
t t t t t t t t tt tt tt t t t t
j
B Bi B n G C D D w L
              
   
Thus, next period’s debt is this period’s debt plus interest on this period’s debt, plus transfers, 
plus public consumption, minus tax revenues.  Taxes are levied on consumption, on business 
sector 1 profits, on distributions of sector 1 firms to their owners, on distributions of sector 2 
firms to their owners, and on labor income.   
Equilibrium conditions 
 Equilibrium  conditions  are   
(i)  Labor, capital, and goods markets clear at each point in time.
6  
(ii) The Household policy functions { ' ( )} jj af s   imply the aggregate law of motion 
                                                        '( ) sF s  . 
3. The Accounts for the Economies 
The primary sources of economic statistics used in this study are the U.S. NIPA accounts 
and fixed assets tables.  Adjustments to the accounts are made so that they better conform to the 
theory used to construct the model economy that we use to draw inference. 
                                                 
6 In the Appendix available at the Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank website, we provide details of the algorithm 
used to compute equilibria. 10 
 
NIPA accounts 
We use balanced growth numbers to restrict the model economy.  Therefore, we look at average 
numbers over a decade. The numbers in Table 1 are the values of U.S. adjusted NIPA, where all 
variables are relative to adjusted GNP and averaged over the period 1999-2008.  The adjustments 
made are as follows. 
  The first adjustment is that services of consumer durables are imputed and added to 
consumption.  This consumption component is consumer durable depreciation plus the product 
of the average after-tax real return on non-consumer durable capital and the beginning-of-year 
stock of consumer durables. The after-tax real return used is 4 percent. 
Consumer durable expenditures are categorized as investment.  On the income side of the 
national accounts, we add consumer durable depreciation to NIPA depreciation and imputed 
consumer durable rents less depreciation to rental income of households. 
  The second adjustment entails dividing government consumption into two parts, a pure 
public good component and a local public good component.  The local public good component is 
added to private consumption. Thus, we treat local public goods as transfer-in-kind to 
households. We follow the NIPA convention of using depreciation as the measure of services of 
government capital provided in government production.  We, however, also add the 4 percent 
after-tax average return on non-public capital times the stock of this government capital to 
government production. Government output is used for government consumption and for making 
transfers in kind to households.   
  The third adjustment is that we subtract the sales tax part of Taxes on Production and 
Imports from capital income on the income side and from consumption on the product side. 11 
 
Thus, unlike NIPA, we are consistent in using business sector prices in constructing the national 
income and product accounts.  
Fixed assets tables 
The stock of capital is the value of capital at its reproduction cost.  The Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) reports its estimate of this value in its Fixed Assets Tables.  We add the value of 
intangible capital owned by private businesses as part of the aggregate capital stock as estimated 
by McGrattan and Prescott (2010).  The stock of business intangible capital is large, averaging 
1.7 over the 10-year period 1999-2008.  We do not include human capital owned by individuals 
in the capital stock because retired people do not rent their human capital to the business sector 
and cannot sell it in order to finance retirement consumption.  This human capital stock is large 
with estimates of just that part acquired on the job are 2.0 times GNP and abstracting from this 
stock would not be appropriate when addressing some other questions.
7 We include land in the 
tangible capital stock, because it is in large part a produced asset associated with real estate 
development.   
  Table 2 reports the value of the stocks of capital.  For stocks with positive investments, 
an equilibrium condition is that these replacement cost values are the present value of the rental 
services provided by the stock.  As most types of capital are produced at a point in time, we 
simply use these replacement numbers as the values recognizing this leads to a modest  
overstatement of the market value of the capital stock.  
                                                 
7 This is the independent estimates of Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) and Parente and Prescott (2000). 12 
 
4. Parameter Selection 
Policy variables 
Table 3 reports the tax rates used in the analysis. There are two categories of businesses that are 
subject to very different taxation. The first category are Schedule C corporations that are subject 
to the corporate income tax. The corporate income tax rate  1
   is about 40 percent for the United 
States.  This rate is estimated by summing federal and state corporate income taxes collected for 
C corporations and dividing by total corporate profits.  There is an additional tax on distributions 
1
d   by these corporations, where distributions are in the form of dividends and buy-backs.  This 
tax rate is about 20% on distribution of these corporations including both federal state income 
taxes over the period 1999-2008. 
The second category of businesses is composed of those that distribute their accounting 
earnings to their owners and whose earnings are treated as ordinary income for income tax 
purposes and taxed at rate  2.
d    This business category includes unincorporated businesses, 
REITS, and Schedule S corporations.  We add household businesses to this set.  The primary 
output of household businesses is imputed rents of real estate and consumer durables that are 
used by the owning household.  Owner-used real estate is subject to sizable property taxes in the 
United States.  These property taxes are treated as taxes on the returns to property used in a 
business.  In the case of household business capital, the tax rates on capital services are about 40 
percent.  
There are two other major differences in the household business sector and other sector 2 
business sectors.  First, the implicit rental income associated with implicitly renting household-
owned real estate to itself is not taxed. Second, household businesses implicitly renting real 
estate to the household owning that business is not permitted to claim depreciation expenses.  13 
 
These two factors are of opposite sign and comparable magnitudes.  For this research, given the 
small size of this sector, the abstraction error resulting from combining this sector with the other 
parts of the private business sector that are not subject to the corporate income tax is small. 
The final business sector is the government production sector, whose values added is 
about an eighth of GNP.   There are additional implicit taxes associated with government 
businesses and additional transfers.  Thus, we think just aggregating it with the non corporate tax 
paying sector is reasonable as it affects little the quantitative findings reported in this paper.  Our 
strategy is to develop and use as simple an abstraction as possible to answer the questions we are 
addressing. Even with this strategy, the abstraction is far from simple and to model all the 
unimportant details of the tax system would greatly complicate the analysis. 
The labor tax 
 is Social Security and Medicare taxes including employer as well as 
worker tax payments.  The high consumption tax rate 
c   at 41.7 percent is in large part due to 
our categorizing income taxes as consumption taxes.  The reason for this categorization is that 
most U.S. households can on margin defer receipt of income and payment of taxes to the time 
retirement consumption occurs.  Virtually all non-consumed income is deferred, so to a first 
approximation, the U.S. income tax system is a consumption-tax system with a convex tax 
schedule.   
We set the level of government consumption to 0.042 times GNP for all periods.  Thus 
0.042 for all  . Gt t     This is the average share of military expenditures in the baseline economy. 
We set the maximum government debt parameter  0.75 for all  . Bt t    We emphasize that 
government debt does not include the debt in government trust funds. Some U.S. government 
debt is foreign held.   This is another feature of reality from which we abstract.   14 
 
Others parameters 
The other parameters are reported in Table 4.  The utility function is logarithmic,  
 (,) l o g l o g ( 1 ) . uc c      
Preference and technology parameters were selected so that the model’s growth rates, hours of 
work, tangible investment shares, and capital-output ratios roughly coincide with U.S. statistics. 
  Table 5 reports aggregate transfers relative to GNP.  The amount of transfers to workers 
may seem large and are much larger than those reported in NIPA. They are large because we 
impute large equal-size imputations to government tax revenues and to government transfers.  
The reason we make this large imputation is that we want the model’s tax rate to be 
approximately equal to the income-weighted average marginal income tax rate for the U.S. tax 
system. Thus, we calibrate the model to estimates of average marginal tax rates and not to 
average tax rates.  Total government revenue is much larger than collected tax revenue because 
important components of income are not taxed and because the income tax schedule is convex.  
We impute transfers equal to the difference between what tax revenues would be if all income 
were taxed at the marginal rates and what actual tax revenues are. 
One item that is not subject to income taxes is fringe benefits, which are about 25 percent 
of total compensation.  We treat the product of average marginal income tax rate and fringe 
benefits as an implicit transfer and tax revenue. We treat government non-military purchases of 
goods and services as transfers in-kind.  An important part of these expenditures are for public 
education, which are primarily transfers to workers and not to retirees.   The final large imputed 
transfer is the difference between income tax receipts if all personal income were taxed at the 
average marginal rate and the actual income tax revenues.  15 
 
Baseline model accounts 
The national accounts for the baseline economy are reported in Table 6 for the policy variables 
and parameters shown in Tables 3–5. Note that income and product are equal to total output less 
intangible investment, which is expensed. Government spending is pre-set and all other 
quantities are found by computing an equilibrium for the baseline parameters. 
Market value of business equity 
For our closed economy, private savings is equal to business equity plus government debt.  In 
this subsection we compare the baseline model economy’s private net worth with the private net 
worth values reported in the Federal Reserve System’s Flow of Funds accounts.  
With taxes, the market value of business equity is less than the value of business capital 
less net business debt.  The value of corporate business equity is approximately equal to the 
predictions of theory as shown in McGrattan and Prescott (2005) for the United States and the 
United Kingdom.
8  The equilibrium relations used to predict the  i V , the market values of the 
business sectors, are 
11 1 1 1 1
22 2 2










    
  
 
The reason for the  1 (1 )
d    factor in the first equation is if retained earnings are use to finance 
tangible investment, the cost of a unit of capital in terms of the composite output good is 
1 (1 )
d   .  In fact, virtually all investment in sector 1 is financed by retained earnings.  The reason 
for the  1 (1 )
   factor is that intangible capital investments are expensed and this reduces taxable 
accounting profits.  For sector 2, all profits except those used to finance intangible capital 
investment are distributed to the households who own the business.  
                                                 
8 These relations hold provided investments in the capital stocks are strictly positive. 16 
 
The total value of the business sector is 
12 , VVV   
which is the value of both net private business debt and equity held directly and indirectly. 
Theory predicts private net worth equals business equity V  plus government debtB . We are 
using the fact that the purchaser’s price for tangible capital is approximately 1 as the capital 
consumption allowance adjustments over the period 1999-2008 were small as were investment 
tax credits and taxes on capital equipment.   
 The  Flow of Funds reported net worth of the private sector that average 4.1 GNPs in the 
1999-2008  period.   This turns out to be smaller than the 5.5 GNPs number predicted by our 
baseline model given our estimates of marginal tax rates.   
To obtain the model prediction we begin with the capital stock of 5.7 GNPs.  We make 
the tax adjustments for taxes on distributions of sector 1 businesses and for the consequence of 
intangible-capital investment being expensed.  This leads to a value of model business equity 
equal to 4.7 GNPs.  To this we add government debt to obtain a predicted private net worth of 
5.5 GNPs. 
There are several factors that need to be considered when comparing predicted and 
reported private net worth.  First, the stock of 5.7 GNPs includes about 0.6 GNPs of public fixed 
assets that are legally owned by the government and not included in U.S. household net worth 
reported by the Federal Reserve.  Second, about 0.2 GNPs of U.S. government debt is foreign 
owned and not part of U.S. household net worth. We could not include it because our model is a 
closed economy. Third, the stock market in the period considered was below predicted by a 
sizable amount.  Fourth, our baseline model has no aggregate  uncertainty and as a result there is 
no aggregate risk-premium.  Fifth, some tangible capital has a q-value less than one because of 17 
 
government subsidies and because there is an excessive supply of some capital goods that result 
in no new capital of that type being produced. Sixth, the Flow-of-Funds estimate of the value of 
sector 2 businesses are not that well measured and almost surely low.  Owners of corporations 
that are not publically traded often have an incentive to undervalue the value of their businesses. 
Given these considerations, the discrepancy between predicted private net worth and 
private net worth as reported in the Flow of Funds account is not large enough to cast doubt on 
the appropriateness of the model used in this analysis.   
5. Evaluation of Alternative Retirement Finance Systems with Current and  
    New Demographics 
We use the calibrated model with the annual growth rate of new entrants into the population 
being either 0 or 1 percent and evaluate two alternative policy regimes.   The first policy regime 
is to continue current tax policies which entail increasing the labor income tax rates over time to 
finance retirement transfers necessitated by the falling number of workers per retiree. The second 
policy regime eliminates all capital income taxes, the labor income tax, and the part of the 
transfers to retirees that are neither welfare nor local public goods.   
  In this section, we report the welfare consequences for the two alternative policies given 
that the initial state is the one for the balanced growth-path state for the baseline economy 
specified in Section 4.  Time t = 0 is when the demographic transition occurs. Those entering the 
workforce in a given year are a cohort. Thus cohort t entered the workforce at time t.  At the time 
of transition the cohorts as indexed by year of workforce entry are  {4 1 ,4 0 , , 1 , 0 } t   and the 
retired cohorts at  { 101, 100, , 42} t    . We determine the welfare consequences for each 
cohort with members alive at the time of the unexpected demographic and policy regime change 18 
 
and the welfare of all cohorts entering the workforce years subsequent to the demographic 
change. But, first we examine the balanced growth policies of the two policy regimes. 
Two retirement financing policies 
Tables 7 and 8 report the tax rates and transfers for the two alternative policies.  The first policy 
is sticking with the current system with increased taxes on labor income used to finance transfers 
to retirees.  This necessitates the labor tax rate be increased from 15 percent to 25 percent over 
time. Total transfers to the old are larger than this number because there are transfers in-kind 
made by state and local governments.  What correspond to labor taxes are FICA and Medicare 
taxes.  Income taxes are treated as consumption taxes as nearly all household income is either 
consumed or saved in deferred compensation retirement accounts. These savings are taxed when 
used to finance retirement consumption. 
Balanced growth comparisons 
We first compare the balanced growth equilibrium, varying demographics and policies.  The 
balanced growth results are reported in Tables 9 to 12.  In each table, we label the baseline 
economy as that with current demographics and current policies. The first alternative economy—
with current demographics and new policy—is the same as the baseline except that taxes and 
transfers are changed. (See Tables 7 and 8.)  The two remaining economies considered are based 
on new demographics, with 0 percent growth in population and two workers per retiree rather 
than three. 
  Table 9 reports summary statistics for the four economies.  All variables have been 
normalized to 1 in the economy with new demographics and current policy to make comparisons 
easier.  In the economies with the new policy, GNP is significantly higher, with the added output 
made possible by increased labor and capital inputs.  Under current demographics, the total labor 19 
 
input is slightly higher because a larger fraction of the population is working. Welfare and 
consumption are also significantly increased with the new policy, whether or not the 
demographics change, when compared to the economy with new demographics and current 
policy. For example, welfare is higher by 23.2 percent and consumption is higher by 46.8 percent 
when taxes on incomes and distributions are eliminated, holding fixed the demographics. 
  Tables 10–12 show how the model's national accounts, fixed assets tables, and flow of 
funds change as we vary policies and demographics.  The results in these tables are all shown 
relative to GNP.  Table 10 shows that eliminating income taxes implies a dramatic shift in 
consumption and investment shares of GNP and the allocation of profits across corporate and 
non-corporate entities that are taxed differently.  Table 11 shows that the capital-output ratios, 
especially the tangible capital-output ratios, increase dramatically when income taxes are 
eliminated.  The results are even more dramatic if we consider the impact on market values, 
which are shown in Table 12.  The market values are a function of both tax rates and capital 
stocks.  Eliminating taxes increases the price of capital and the quantity.  This is especially true 
for the intangible market values which roughly double when income taxes are eliminated. 
Welfare comparisons by cohorts 
A question that arises is what are the welfare consequences in the transition to balanced growth. 
Do some birth-year cohorts lose? Answering this question requires computing the equilibrium 
transition path. Given the state variable of the economy has a high dimension, computing the 
equilibrium is computationally intensive and only recently has there been the computation power 
to carry out these computations in a reasonable amount of time.  We have calculated the 
transition paths for the two policies. We emphasize that there are transfers over the remainder of 
their lifetime to those alive at the time of the demographic change for the alternative policy 20 
 
regime.  The paths of age-dependent transfers and tax rates are reported in the Appendix for the 
new policy.
9  
Figure 1 plots the welfare gains in remaining lifetime consumption-equivalents of cohorts 
by age at the time t = 0, when growth in the number of new workers falls from 1 percent per year 
to 0 percent per year.  An important point is that current retirees and those currently near 
retirement do not lose.  Promised retirement transfers are made to these groups.  All age cohorts 
from the currently old benefit.  Gains for retirees are on the order of 5 percent.  Gains for current 
workers that can take advantage of lower taxes are closer to 6 percent.  Gains for future cohorts 
are in the range of 6 to 23 percent.  This is a Paretto improving outcome.   
6. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
We find that the fall in the number of workers per retiree can be handled without major change in 
the retirement financing scheme.  However, there are tax policy changes that dramatically 
increase welfare.  These changes entail eliminating capital income taxes and relying more on 
saving for retirement and less on lump-sum transfers to retirees.  
  We see this analysis as significantly advancing our understanding of alternative policies 
to finance retirement consumption.  The broadening of the (non-human) capital stock is 
important as is requiring the model to be consistent with both capital accounts and net worth 
accounts. Also important is the recognition that including implicit transfers, increases the size of 
the government sector from about 35 percent to 44 percent of U.S. GNP.  
  Through discussions and insights we hope and expect that better abstractions for 
predicting the consequences of alternative tax and transfer policies will develop. We have 
costless and perfect annuitization and no bequest motive. Introducing these would increase the 
                                                 
9 The appendix is available at the Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank website. 21 
 
stock of savings.  On the other hand we do not model the rival human capital investments made 
over working lives and this may have a consequence for the stock of savings.
10   
Another point is that mandatory savings and insurance mitigates the problem of some 
people not saving enough for retirement and outliving their savings.  Mandatory savings and 
insurance, which are not binding for most people, do not distort the labor-leisure and 
intertemporal consumption choices. 
                                                 
10 Johanna Wallenius (2011) has analyzed the consequence of rival human capital production on the job for the 
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TABLE 1. REVISED NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT ACCOUNTS, 
AVERAGES RELATIVE TO GNP, 1999–2008
a 
TOTAL ADJUSTED INCOME   1.000 
 Labor  Income    .594 
    Compensation of employees (NIPA 1.10)  .539 
    70% of proprietors’ income (NIPA 1.10)  .055 
 Capital  Income    .238 
    Corporate profits with IVA and CCadj (NIPA 1.10)  .074 
    30% of proprietors’ income (NIPA 1.10)  .023 
    Government enterprises (NIPA 1.10)  .000 
    Rental income of persons with CCadj (NIPA 1.10)  .016 
    Net interest and miscellaneous payments (NIPA 1.10)  .057 
    Statistical discrepancy (NIPA 1.10)   .005 
    Taxes on production and imports
b (NIPA 1.10)  .029 
  Less: Sales tax (NIPA 3.5)  .043 
    Imputed capital services
c (FA 1.1)  .036 
    Net income, rest of world (NIPA 1.13)  .006 
 Tangible  Depreciation    .168 
    Consumption of fixed capital (NIPA 1.10)  .116 
    Consumer durable depreciation (FOF F.10)  .053 
TOTAL ADJUSTED PRODUCT    1.000 
  Consumption    .738 
    Personal consumption expenditures (NIPA 1.1.5)   .659 
  Less: Consumer durables (NIPA 1.1.5)  .083 
  Less: Sales tax, nondurables and services  .036 
    Consumer durable depreciation (FOF F10)  .053 
    Government consumption, nondefense (NIPA 3.9.5)   .110 
    Imputed capital services
c   .036 
 
See footnotes at the end of the table. 25 
 
TABLE 1. REVISED NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT ACCOUNTS, 
AVERAGES RELATIVE TO GNP, 1999–2008
a 
 
 Government  spending    .042 
    Government expenditures, national defense (NIPA 1.1.5)  .042 
 Tangible  investment    .222 
    Gross private domestic investment (NIPA 1.1.5)  .156 
    Consumer durables (NIPA 1.1.5)  .083 
  Less: Sales tax, durables  .005 
    Government investment, nondefense (NIPA 3.9.5)  .025 
    Net exports of goods and services (NIPA 1.1.5)   .043 
    Net income, rest of world (NIPA 1.13)  .006 
 
Note: IVA, inventory valuation adjustment; CCadj, capital consumption adjustment; NIPA, 
national income and product accounts; FA, fixed assets; FOF, flow of funds. 
a  Expressions in parentheses are the data sources and table numbers. 
b  This category includes business transfers and excludes subsidies. 
c Imputed capital services are equal to 4 percent times the current-cost net stock of government 




TABLE 2. REVISED FIXED ASSET TABLES, 
AVERAGES RELATIVE TO GNP, 1999–2008
a 
 
  TANGIBLE CAPITAL, END OF PERIOD   4.053 
    Private assets, private (FA 1.1)  2.175 
    Fixed assets, public (FA 1.1)  .580 
    Consumer durables (FA 1.1)  .306 
  Inventories  (NIPA  5.7.5)  .137 
    Land (FOF B.100-B.103)  .856 
  INTANGIBLE CAPITAL, END OF PERIOD   1.718 
    Plant specific, McGrattan-Prescott (2010)  1.198 
    Technology capital, McGrattan-Prescott (2010)  .519 
  TOTAL   5.771 
 
Note: FA, fixed assets; FOF, flow of funds. 
a  Expressions in parentheses are the data sources and table numbers. 
 
 
TABLE 3. POLICY VARIABLES USED IN CALIBRATION 
 
1
    0.400 
1
d    0.200 
2
d    0.400 

  0.150 
c    0.417 
G    0.042 
B    0.750 
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TABLE 4. PARAMETERS OF THE ECONOMY CALIBRATED TO U.S. DATA 
 
  Demographic parameters   
       Growth rate of population  1.0% 
       Work life  42  years 
        Number of workers per retirees  3 
Preference parameters   
           1.300 
            0.987 
Technology parameters         
        12  and      0.500 
         1T    0.060 
        2T    0.060 
        1I    0.030 
        2I    0.030 
          2.0% 
       1T    0.220 
       1I    0.180 
       2T    0.500 
      2I    0.080 28 
 
TABLE 5. AGGREGATE TRANSFERS RELATIVE TO GNP USED IN CALIBRATION 
 
To retirees  0.148 
      Retirement   0.100 
      Local public goods  0.048 
To workers  0.292 





TABLE 6. BASELINE MODEL NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT ACCOUNTS, 
AVERAGES RELATIVE TO GNP, 1999-2008 
 
INCOME (Y  XI)   
  Labor Income (wL) .577 
 Capital  Income  (Y  wL  iiTKiT  XI)  .423 
         Tangible Depreciation (iiTKiT)  .146 
           Sector 1 Corporate (1TK1T)  .059 
           Sector 2 Non-corporate (2TK2T)  .088 
            
PRODUCT (Y  XI)   
 Consumption  (C) .694 
 Tangible  investment  (XT) .264 
           Sector 1 Corporate (X1T) .088 
           Sector 2 Non-corporate (X2T) .176 
 Government  (G) .042 
  
Addenda: Intangible investment (XI) .110 
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TABLE 7.  BALANCED GROWTH TAX RATES FOR ALTERNATIVE POLICIES 
 
  Current Demographics  New Demographics 
    Current Policy    New Policy  Current Policy  New Policy 
    1
    .400 .000  .400  .000 
    1
d    .200 .000  .200  .000 
    2
d    .400 .000  .400  .000 
   
  .150 .000  .250  .000 
   




TABLE 8. BALANCED GROWTH AGGREGATE TRANSFERS: 
RELATIVE TO GNP 
 
    Current Demographics  New Demographics 
    Current Policy   New Policy  Current Policy  New Policy 
Total transfers    .440  .146  .512  .154 
   To retirees    .148  .036  .233  .051 





TABLE 9. BALANCED GROWTH SUMMARY STATISTICS 
RELATIVE TO NEW DEMOGRAPHICS AND CURRENT POLICY 
 
    Current Demographics  New Demographics 
    Current Policy   New Policy  Current Policy  New Policy 
GNP    1.150  1.730  1.000  1.638 
Consumption     1.085  1.450  1.000  1.468 
Tangible investment    1.361  2.653  1.000  2.195 
          
Capital  stock   1.170  2.119  1.000 2.044 
Hours per worker    1.030  1.293  1.000  1.329 
          





TABLE 10. NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT ACCOUNTS RELATIVE TO GNP, 
 BALANCED GROWTH FOR ALTERNATIVE POLICIES 
 
    Current Demographics  New Demographics 
    Current Policy   New Policy  Current Policy  New Policy 
 C    .694  .616  .735  .659 
  XT   .264  .342  .223  .299 
 G    .042 .042  .042  .042 
          
  iT iT
i
K      .146  .189  .145  .194 
  wL   .577  .574  .567  .568 
  1     .076  .064  .084  .068 
  2     .201  .173  .204  .170 
          




TABLE 11. FIXED ASSETS RELATIVE TO GNP, 
 BALANCED GROWTH FOR ALTERNATIVE POLICIES 
 
    Current Demographics  New Demographics 
    Current Policy   New Policy  Current Policy  New Policy 
  T K     4.016 5.237 3.950  5.344 
  1 T K     1.010 1.244 0.992  1.256 
  2 T K     3.006 3.993 2.959  4.088 
         
  I K    1.712 1.656 1.679  1.682 
  1 I K     1.047 1.018 1.026  1.028 
  2 I K     0.664 0.639 0.663  0.654 
         
  K    5.728 6.893  5.629 7.026 
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TABLE 12. MARKET VALUES OF PRIVATE SECTOR  NET ASSETS RELATIVE TO GNP, 
BALANCED GROWTH FOR ALTERNATIVE POLICIES 
 
    Current Demographics  New Demographics 
    Current Policy   New Policy  Current Policy  New Policy 
  T V   3.814  5.237  3.752  5.344 
  1 T V    0.808  1.244  0.793  1.256 
  2 T V     3.006 3.993  2.959  4.088 
  I V 
 
0.901 1.656  0.884  1.682 
  1 I V    0.503  1.018  0.493  1.028 
  2 I V    0.399  0.639  0.392  0.654 
          





Percentage Welfare Gain of New Policy by Cohort Age at Time of Regime Change 
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